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 The Art of War by Sun Tzu is one of, if not the most influential military 
manuscripts of all time.  The methodologies outlined by Sun Tzu are still being 
taught at the world’s most prestigious military academies, including the U.S 
Naval Academy and West Point.  Sun Tzu saw war as much more than just 
fighting or the movement of pawns on a board, “War is a grave affair of state; it is 
a place of life and death, a road to survival and extinction, a matter to be 
pondered carefully.”1 To Sun Tzu and his followers war is a matter life and 
death.  Not only did he understand the military tactics required for success in any 
campaign, but the social and political implications of war that lead to defeat 
without a single battle being fought.  Sun Tzu’s work shines a light onto the 
underlying factors of war, explaining in great detail how they determine the 
outcome of every war past or present.  His message of proper military strategy is 
put on display in an emphatic fashion during the Vietnam War.  By analyzing The 
Art of War it becomes clear that Sun Tzu predicted the Viet Cong’s victory and 
the United States’ failure centuries in advance.  He was considered the greatest 
military strategist of his time, but the origin and even the existence of Sun Tzu is 
questioned.  “As John Minford, translator of a new edition of this text, has 
observed, if whoever wrote it ‘was indeed an advisor to King He Lu …, then he 
would have been a contemporary of Confucius (551-478 BCE).  And yet he is not 
mentioned once in the Zuo Commentary, the principle source for the history of 
the period.  Despite this fact, by the Han dynasty (206 BCE - 220 CE), everyone 
knew of Master Sun the Strategist, and his name had become inseparable from 
The Art of War.”2 No matter who Sun Tzu was his legend lives on through his 
famous treatise. 
Sun Tzu’s story began in 500 BCE when King He Lu of the state of Wu, 
located in Eastern China, called Sun Tzu to address the threat of an invasion 
from the state of Chu.  Sun Tzu claimed to be able to turn anyone into a soldier, 
so He Lu challenged him to turn the palace women into soldiers.  Sun Tzu 
showed the women the basic maneuvers, appointed the two eldest women 
platoon leaders and ordered the exercise to begin.  After one failed attempt Sun  
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Tzu reiterated his orders to the women.  After the second failed attempt Sun Tzu, 
in front of everyone, executed the platoon leaders and immediately appointed 
two new ones.  The third time he ordered them to do the exercise the women 
followed his instructions perfectly and without hesitation.  After the display Sun 
Tzu was granted full control over the Wu army by King He Lu.   
Outnumbered and out trained, Sun Tzu used his strategic principles 
outlined in The Art of War, including the use of spies, deception, knowledge of 
the landscape, and most importantly knowing your enemy.  Using mostly guerilla 
tactics Sun Tzu and the Wu forces struck quickly, yet decisively and 
disappeared.  Sun Tzu and his military exploits are legendary, outnumbered, out 
trained, or fighting against insurmountable odds, it didn’t matter Sun Tzu 
accounted for every situation and had a strategy that resulted in victory.  “... Sun 
Tzu’s general intent is clear - to analyze the diversity of interdependent choice 
situations in warfare and to deduce efficient strategies - plans of action that lead 
to victory, broadly defined.”3 Through his superior strategies and tactics Sun Tzu 
was able to win the support of neighboring kingdoms who joined his fight against 
the Chu.  As his forces grew, Sun Tzu could go on the offensive and despite the 
bad hand he was dealt he was able to defeat the Chu army in decisive fashion.  
 If you follow Sun Tzu and his teachings, you will go to war with victory 
ensured, but if you ignore The Art of War defeat is inevitable.  “Although 
immensely popular in the Far East, and widely available in Europe, the message 
of Sun Tzu has been seriously neglected in America.”4 Many wars throughout 
history are proof of this statement, but there is no greater example than 
America’s defeat in Vietnam.  Did the Viet Cong defeat the United States, or did 
we defeat ourselves?  Despite having a much more powerful, highly trained, and 
organized military the United States was defeated in Vietnam just as the 
Kingdom of Chu was defeated by Sun Tzu.  The Viet Cong used the principles 
that Sun Tzu outlined in The Art of War, deception, use of spies, knowledge of  
the enemy and landscape as their victory was ensured from the moment the 
United States set foot in Vietnam. 
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 “Know the enemy, know yourself, and victory is never in doubt, not in a 
hundred battles.”5 Superior knowledge is the key to success in warfare, therefore 
before going to war, one needs to know everything about the enemy.  You need 
to know their culture, their history, and their strategy.  The Viet Cong were 
fanatically devoted to fighting to unify their country, no matter the price.  The 
country had constantly been at war since World War II when they fought against 
the Japanese.  They eventually fell victim to the Japanese occupation, but their 
fighting spirit never wavered.  The guerilla tactics used by the Viet Cong were 
more well suited to fighting at home where they were masters of the terrain.  The 
United States knew of, but chose to ignore these factors about the 
Vietnamese.  In contrast the Viet Cong knew us.  They knew as a foreign 
combatant, we would fight a traditional campaign that their guerilla tactics could 
pick apart.  They knew the tactics behind every movement that the American 
forces took.  In many cases this understanding included our lack of tactics; like 
our habit of blindly sending counterinsurgent patrols where they could easily be 
picked off by the Viet Cong fighters they were so desperately searching 
for.  They knew drawing the war out would demoralize the troops and the 
American public, who were already apprehensive about fighting to begin 
with.  The effect of this demoralization led to multiple offensive campaigns by 
military leaders, which produced occasional individual and group atrocities 
against non-combatants by American soldiers.  These atrocities accelerated the 
decline in support for the war back home, marked by numerous anti-war protests 
across the nation.  The continuation of the war despite the nationwide desire for 
its end left a tainted feeling that surrounds the legacy of Vietnam to this day.  
Vietnam was the first so called ‘televised war’, where the American news 
media brought the horror of war into living rooms on a daily basis. “Vietnam 
veterans for years felt tainted by the stigma of unallocated blame because of the  
failure to prosecute the guilty, no matter how numerous or high ranking.”6 In 
addition to demoralizing troops overseas, drawing out the war took a drastic toll 
on support of the war back home.  Sun Tzu said, “No nation has ever benefited  
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from a protracted war”7 America was sending citizens to and spending money on 
a war the public wanted to end.  It is impossible to win a war overseas when you 
have virtually no support at home.  The Americans and the Viet Cong had polar 
opposite approaches in the Vietnam War, one based on ignorance and one 
based on knowledge.  One led to defeat and the other led to victory. 
“The Way of war is a way of deception.  When able, feign inability; when 
deploying troops appear not to be.  When near, appear far; when far, appear 
near.  Lure with bait; strike with chaos.”8 Sun Tzu believed that deception was 
one of the most valuable tools in warfare.  When deception is combined with 
knowledge, the effectiveness of your strategy increases exponentially.  The Viet 
Cong were masters of deception, troop and supply movements were done in 
complete secret.  Using a vast underground network of tunnels the Viet Cong 
were able to move troops and supplies in complete accordance with Sun Tzu’s 
principle of deception.  The United States failed miserably to be deceptive when 
it came to movement of units.  To clear a path for troops, we would carpet bomb 
areas before sending ground forces to sweep out any remaining 
insurgents.  Wherever the bombs dropped, the troops were not far behind, and 
the Viet Cong knew it. They would flock to and surround the area and, as Sun 
Tzu would put it, strike with chaos. “The results consistently show that bombing 
was counterproductive as a counterinsurgency practice.  High frequencies of 
bombing corresponded unambiguously to higher levels of downstream control by 
the Viet Cong.”9 The Viet Cong would repeat this pattern as the Americans 
repeated it, and were able to gain ground in the war effort as the years went on.   
Vietnam is what Sun Tzu would refer to as Deadlock ground, “‘Deadlock’ 
means that neither side finds it advantageous to make a move.  On deadlock 
terrain, even if our enemy offers bait, we do not make a move; we lure him out; 
we retreat.  And when half his troops are out, that is our moment to strike.”10 One 
of the United States’ biggest mistakes in Vietnam was going to war without a 
clear objective.  There was no clear cut target for the Americans to capture to 
end the war, because the Viet Cong lacked a central base of operation.  The Viet  
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Cong were spread across the country, which prevented the United States 
from attacking and wiping them out with a single blow.  When troops were sent 
out on patrol fewer and fewer would come back.  The Viet Cong were able to pick 
off both incoming and outgoing patrols by surrounding United States bases and 
simply waiting for the opportunity to present itself.  The Viet Cong didn’t have to 
take the risk of mounting a major direct assault on United States forces because 
they didn’t have to win battles to win the war.  “Ultimate excellence lies not in 
winning every battle but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.”11 The Viet 
Cong were winning the war without having to launch a single attack.  To the Viet 
Cong a war of attrition was a success because on Deadlock ground, where any 
move for either side could be fatal, they would always have the ability to watch 
and wait until the moment to strike presented itself.  
“Spies are a key element in warfare.  On them depends an army’s every 
move.”12 Sun Tzu views spies as one of the most valuable assets in warfare 
because of the strategic purpose they serve.  He described five types of spies: 
local, internal, double, dead and live.  Each serving their own important strategic 
purpose.  Local spies come from fellow countrymen, internal come from inserting 
spies into the forces of the enemy, double spies feedback false information, dead 
spies deliberately provide the enemy with false information, and live spies return 
with information.  The Viet Cong possessed a vast intelligence network made up 
of local, internal, dead and live spies.  Their local spies were sympathetic 
civilians.  Among the South Vietnamese population the Viet Cong had supporters 
that passed information gathered by simply observing the American troops. The 
Viet Cong possessed internal spies, disguised as South Vietnamese soldiers that 
infiltrated American bases and gathered information from within.  The dead spies 
would allow false information to be intercepted by American spies hopelessly 
attempting to infiltrate the complex Viet Cong intelligence network.  The live spies 
played the largest role in the Viet Cong intelligence network.  They gathered  
valuable information regarding numerous aspects of the tactics and strategy of 
the United States. Knowing every punch that is about to be thrown at you and  
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where your opponent’s openings will be gives you an insurmountable advantage 
over your opponent.  The use of spies by the Viet Cong was an essential part of 
their success in the war. 
 “Managing many is the same as managing few; it is a question of 
division.  Fighting with many is the same as fighting with few,”13 We think of war 
as a numbers game, the side with the most soldiers and most firepower will win, 
but Sun Tzu refutes this principle.  He and the army of Wu were greatly 
outnumbered by the Chu army, but Sun Tzu emerged victorious because of his 
superior handling of strategy.  He was able to get the most out of limited 
resources he possessed.  The Viet Cong were outnumbered and outgunned, but 
like Sun Tzu they emerged victorious.  The tight guerilla structure of the Viet 
Cong combined with their massive network of tunnels spread across the entire 
country made it impossible to deal a direct blow to a large percentage of their 
insurgency.  Having a suitably sized fighting force spread across the country 
allowed the Viet Cong to strike decisively and then disappear anywhere without 
leaving a clue where they were headed next.  Contrary to the widespread strike 
and disappear strategy employed by the Viet Cong the United States 
consolidated their forces.  American military bases provided a clear objective 
point for the Viet Cong to target.  The Viet Cong knew they couldn’t mount a full 
out offensive on the bases themselves, but they could wait just outside and pick 
off incoming and outgoing soldiers.  Having a consolidated area holding all of our 
troops and resources provided a clear target that the widespread Viet Cong were 
able to take advantage of.  The Viet Cong were able to maximize the potential of 
their fighting force, despite being outmanned and outgunned they were effective 
in accomplishing their objectives.          
 “The wise general is a Lord of Destiny; he holds the nation’s peace or peril 
in his hands”14 the implementation of a strong chain of command is essential to 
properly executing Sun Tzu’s strategies.  The American chain of command in 
Vietnam, headed by General Westmoreland, was accustomed to fighting a 
traditional campaign proved another one of Sun Tzu’s principles, “The general  
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who cannot master his anger orders his troops out like ants, sending one in three 
to their deaths.”15 They were conditioned to fighting a traditional war, but now 
sending troops on what would be routine counterinsurgency patrols was turned 
into marching them to their deaths.  “Westmoreland was not proposing a ‘new’ 
concept of operations or a change in basic military strategy.  Offensive 
operations designed to locate main force units and their bases remained the 
focus of his strategy.”16 Fighting a search and destroy war in an environment like 
Vietnam showed a clear lack of leadership, flexibility, and military creativity in the 
United States’ command structure. “Lewy is especially critical of Westmoreland’s 
search and destroy strategy.  It represents, he says, the ‘traditional attack 
mission of infantry,’ but since the ‘setting of a counterinsurgency was in the 
environment of Vietnam posed anything but traditional problems, the results of 
this conventional way of thinking and acting were to prove a great 
disappointment.’”17 As previously discussed Vietnam had no endgame, there was 
no objective that the United States could take to bring the war would end.  The 
United States military was running a search and destroy campaign with nothing 
particular to search for and destroy.  The Vietnam War became an exercise in 
futility that, according to the records of the National Archives, resulted in the loss 
of 58,220 American lives.  “Not until 1995 did Vietnam release its official estimate 
of war dead: as many as 2 million civilians on both sides and some 1.1 million 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters.”18  
The Viet Cong did not experience the same failures from their commander 
General Vo Nguyen Giap.  General Westmoreland and General Giap were polar 
opposites.  Westmoreland received training at West Point, Giap’s education in 
warfare was completely self taught.  Westmoreland was traditional, rigid, and  
lost, Giap was untraditional, adaptive, and won. General Giap was not pressured 
to win the war in a quick hard hitting campaign like his United States 
counterpart.  He took the methodic approach of guerilla strike and disappear 
warfare.  His command over the Viet Cong was characterized by organized, 
quick strikes that devastated the United States forces that were attempting a  
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traditional campaign in an untraditional environment.  His leadership of the Viet 
Cong provided an effective guerilla strategy that helped them win the 
war.  Westmoreland and Giap took very different approaches that reflected their  
backgrounds, one led to crushing defeat and the other to undeniable victory, 
proving Sun Tzu’s idea that the general holds the fate of the nation in their 
hands. 
The one time the Viet Cong ignored Sun Tzu it led to disaster, the Tet 
Offensive on January 30th 1968.  It started as a brilliant Sun Tzu deception 
tactic, agreeing to an armistice during the holiday period known as Tet, then 
launching an attack when the enemies guard would be down.  The error in the 
plan was that Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Communist North Vietnamese, wanted 
the victory to end the war in one decisive blow.  “While the Americans were not 
winning, they had the power to expand the war.  On the other hand, while the 
communists had successfully managed to withstand the US military power, they 
were not able to achieve a decisive victory.  Their goal continued to be a decisive 
victory in a relatively short time.”19 The Tet Offensive ignored the fact that 
Vietnam was ‘Deadlock ground’ making a direct attack disadvantageous and 
unnecessary.  Tet would consist of multiple widespread attacks on United States 
bases all across the country ignoring Sun Tzu’s idea that, “The skillful warrior 
attacks so that the enemy cannot defend; he defends so the enemy cannot 
attack.”20 General Giap didn’t want to go through with the Tet Offensive because 
he saw the flaws of the plan, despite his General’s Ho Chi Minh demanded the 
plan be carried out.  Spreading the Viet Cong guerrilla fighting force so thin for a 
widespread direct assault went against the winning formula the Viet Cong had 
produced and proved a costly decision.  By attacking where the Americans could 
defend themselves the Viet Cong cracked open a window of opportunity for the 
American soldiers who could now take the fight to the Viet Cong.  The Tet 
Offensive led to an extended period of fighting that produced numerous 
casualties on both sides.  Tet had no winners or losers, but the military 
consequences were more detrimental to the Viet Cong resulting in the loss of  
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70,000 soldiers.  The Viet Cong lost their strategic advantage and the press 
coverage of the Tet Offensive greatly impacted public opinion of the war, “Many 
members of the American media used Tet to underscore their arguments that the 
war in Vietnam was unwinnable and venerable broadcast journalist Walter 
Cronkite questioned U.S policies in a February 1968, asserting, ‘we are now in a 
stalemate.’  Lyndon Johnson allegedly responded, ‘If we’ve lost Cronkite, we’ve 
lost the country.’”21 The Tet Offensive, despite its strategic failures, marked a 
turning point in the Vietnam War. 
 The United States military has failed to learn from its strategic 
shortcomings even after observing the disaster that occurred in Vietnam.  The 
inability to acknowledge flawed strategy has and will lead to more military 
blunders.  “As the United States finds itself involved in a dire counterinsurgency 
campaign in Afghanistan, with little apparent reason for optimism, some political 
scientists have turned their attention to the origins and development of U.S 
military strategy in Vietnam for readily applicable lessons.”22 The application of 
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War will result in victory, but the United States military 
continues to take the traditional approach, failing to understand the error of their 
ways.  The United States military has been repeating the same action for 
decades, expecting a different result.  Unless you adapt you are destined to fail, 
be it in Vietnam or in Afghanistan.     
The Vietnam War provides us with evidence that Sun Tzu’s The Art of War 
stands the test of time.  The Art of War strategies and tactics used by Sun Tzu in 
500 BCE are applicable to modern and future wars because Sun Tzu stripped 
war down to the bones.  Sun Tzu identified the underlying factors that determine 
who will be victorious on the battlefield, but he also understood the political and  
social implications of waging war.  War is much more than fighting or moving 
pawns on a board, a war can be won or lost without a single battle being fought,  
it is life and it is death.  The most important factor that Sun Tzu teaches is 
knowledge because, “He who knows neither self nor enemy will fail in every 
battle.”23 Being able to collect knowledge and the application of that knowledge  
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are two of the most critical aspects of warfare.  The Art of War and its teachings 
will be immortal because the basic tenants of war never change. 
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